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The post-Dayton media landscape in the Balkans could not have been more
unfavorable for the development of free and pluralistic media. This chapter analy-
ses the short comings and offers a list of recommendations that might contribute
to setting priorities and achieving better results in the next stages of “media inter-
vention”, not only in the Balkans but also in countries experiencing a less trau-
matic transition to democracy1.
The American-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement, initialed on
November 21, 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, and signed on December 14 in Paris, ended
the three-and-a-half-year war in Bosnia, which left more than 200,000 people
dead and more than one and a half million driven from their homes. Focused on
the main task at Dayton, “to end a war”–as the main negotiator, American
ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s book (1998) is entitled– international mediators
almost completely neglected the role of the media in the peace process. The
media were mentioned only briefly, in Annex 3 of the agreement, giving the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) a mandate for media
issues as part of its role in organizing and supervising elections. The signatories
are obliged by that Annex to “ensure that conditions exist for the organization of
free and fair elections, in particular a politically neutral environment... [and] shall
ensure freedom of expression and of the press”2.
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Thus Dayton left the Balkan media in the hands of those who had
used them to stir ethnic intolerance in the first place. Yugoslav media remained in
Slobodan Milosevic’s hands; Croatian in Franjo Tudjman’s; and Bosnian in the
hands of the three nationalist parties. 
The post-Dayton media landscape in the Balkans could not have been
more unfavorable for the development of free and pluralistic media. On the one
hand, the international institutions fully realized that the media had played an
instrumental role in creating and maintaining the war mentality, a fact that had
been established in reports, memoirs, and debates on the Balkans in the 1990s.
On the other hand, the agreement left the “bad guys” in control not only of their
by now “ethnically pure” territories but also of the media in all three states as
well as Bosnia’s two entities and ten cantons. 
There was a built-in obstacle to the stated goal of the international
intervention in the post-Dayton years: while supporting the Dayton agreement
might have been the price to end the war, leaving control of the area in the hands
of those most responsible for the war made it extremely difficult to develop the
institutions of a functioning civil society, including the media. Following the
Dayton script, most of the international post-war media efforts in Bosnia con-
tributed to the apartheid-like partition of the country. In the process the few inde-
pendent media voices that supported a multiethnic Bosnia remained not only
under attack by the nationalist parties that had an interest in fostering ethnic sep-
aration, but also marginalized by many in the international donor community
who chose to work with the ethnic separatists in support of Dayton. 
The initial results were, predictably, tragic. For example, the president
of the council controlling the most influential media organization in Republika
Srpska –Serb Radio and Television (SRT)– was Momcilo Krajisnik, the closest asso-
ciate of war-time Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic. Krajisnik himself was
later indicted and arrested for war crimes. Under his direct supervision, Serb TV
treated Republika Srpska as a separate state, actively undermining any effort to
reintegrate the country. The station reported on events in the Federation only in
its “From Abroad” news program. Everything the SRT did following the signing of
the Dayton agreement was aimed at proving that there was no possibility of coex-
istence among the three Bosnian ethnic groups. The international community’s
first High Representative in Bosnia, Carl Bildt, was quoted as saying: “They put
out propaganda that even Stalin would be ashamed of”3.
Bosnia’s post-war media landscape mirrored the image of that devas-
tated country. In Serb and Croat-controlled territories, all media –newspapers,
radio, and television alike– preached ethnic apartheid. In the Bosniak-controlled
areas, the pre-war mainstream multiethnic media such as the daily Oslobodjenje
(Libreration) and Radio and TV of Bosnia Herzegovina, continued to exist under a
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double burden. They had suffered heavy losses in their struggle to operate under
the siege –with their facilities and assets bombed and looted, dozens of the most
experienced journalists gone, and millions of German marks in debt– all of which
would be difficult to recover under even the most favorable conditions. But there
was an additional burden: the international community’s acceptance of Bosnia’s
“new realities” of partition. While internationals still paid lip service to the media
that maintained the spirit of inter-ethnic tolerance under the most adverse condi-
tions, they didn’t see a role for them in a country organized strictly along Bosniak-
Croat-Serb lines. 
“Daytonized” media
By early 1996, on the heels of a 60,000-strong NATO-led peacekeeping force,
dozens of international NGOs and hundreds of mostly well-intentioned enthusi-
asts –journalists, media practitioners, and trainers– converged on Bosnia with a
mission and, in some cases, a respectable amount of money to help establish free
media in the country. Unfortunately, they made some strategic misjudgments as
well as some regrettable mistakes. Strategically, they were instructed to operate
within the Dayton framework, making the Bosnian media a party to all compro-
mises with the ultranationalists instead of encouraging and supporting them to
break free and become independent observers and critics of nationalist manipula-
tion of the past and present. 
Why was it necessary to “daytonize” the Bosnian media, making them
a part of the “deal with the devil”, when that issue had not been regulated by the
peace agreement? Carl Bildt told me that when he came to Bosnia he found the
media as divided as the country. There was never any decision on the part of the
international community to “daytonize” the media, Bildt said. He explained that
there was great international reluctance to do anything that could be seen
as interference in the media. SDA had a very strong constituency in
Washington, and I remember that any slight move that might be interpret-
ed as undermining BH TV had to be handled very carefully in light of this.
With [the Serb] Pale TV the problem was different. I argued for us to use
our military instruments to force it to behave less virulently, but this came
up against the fears of “mission creep” in NATO, and it was not until
General Wesley Clark took over European command that NATO agreed to
take direct action against the Pale transmitters. Although I had argued vig-
orously for that action, it happened only after I had left4.
Regardless of their intentions, the international organizations legitimized the
nationalists’ control over the media by accepting that they had to deal exclusively
with the ultranationalists. The newly-established OSCE’s Media Experts
Commission, for example, in addition to international representatives, included
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the designated representatives of the three Bosnian governments (Joint, Federal,
and Serb) as well as “qualified media specialists appointed by each of the par-
ties”. Of course, these “parties”, the same ones that presided over the war, were
not likely to appoint independent-minded, tolerant, anti-nationalist individuals to
the body controlling the media. This need among international mediators always
to have clear ethnic representation with people appointed by the “the parties” or
“acceptable to all three sides” favored either solid nationalists or mediocre jour-
nalists with no name or reputation. It was a criterium that sidelined, in media
rebuilding efforts, those who belonged to “the fourth party”: the party of profes-
sional journalism.
One notable exception in supporting early efforts to establish free
media in Bosnia was George Soros’s Open Society Fund. Open Society had, after
all, two distinct advantages over all other media donors: first, the organization had
extended its helping hand to the struggling Bosnian media even during the siege
of Sarajevo, well aware of what Bosnia used to be; and second, it relied on Bosnian
media professionals with a deep understanding of local values and priorities. 
The country’s media scene presented both Bosnian journalism and
international “media interventionists” with a variety of challenges. For example,
Bosnian Radio and TV, which compromised its pre-war reputation for independ-
ence by accepting Muslim SDA-led government control during the war, was still
the best equipped, most professional and to some extent multiethnic broadcast
outlet, with the best prospect of being rebuilt as a state-wide public broadcasting
station. But instead of cutting off the instruments of SDA control and restoring its
country-wide outreach, complemented by the development of regional electron-
ic media, the international community practically legalized the war-time looting
of its assets, transmitters, and equipment, leaving them in the hands of “Serb
TV” and “Croat TV”, and accepting hard-line Serbs’ and Croats’ claim that any-
thing coming from Sarajevo was “unacceptable”. No wonder then that, in the
months leading up to the first post-war elections held in September 1996,
nationalist Serb and Croat TV continued to insist on war-time partition, treating
the territories under the control of nationalist parties as states completely sepa-
rate from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
“Carl Bildt TV”
Looking for alternatives, the international community opted for a TV and radio
program of its own. Just before the elections, it launched TV-IN, later renamed
OBN (Open Broadcast Network), and FERN (Free Elections Radio Network) Radio.
OBN started on September 7, 1996, with a credibility problem. It was called “Carl
Bildt TV”, suggesting it was under the control of the Office of the High
Representative (OHR), and was dismissed by all three nationalist parties. SDS and
HDZ dismissed it for being established in Sarajevo and being carried predominant-
ly through the Bosniak TV network; the SDA labeled it “unpatriotic”, a competi-
tion to “our Bosnian TV”. 
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OBN faced both technological and professional limitations.
Technologically, it needed a network of local TV stations to carry its signal to the
Bosnian audience. Initially, there were five stations: NTV 99 and Hayat in Sarajevo,
TV Mostar, the Zenica-based Zetel, and TV Tuzla, with NTV 99 withdrawing from
the project as soon as it received its share of the internationally-supplied equip-
ment. OBN was largely understaffed in its central studio, while member-stations
were not able to contribute news programming at a level expected in the coun-
try-wide network. Affiliation with local partners, some of which were clearly
Muslim-only, hurt credibility. For example, throughout the month of Ramadan,
Hayat TV broadcast long hours of religious programming produced in Iran, play-
ing into the hands of both Serb and Croat nationalists who wanted to undermine
anything all-Bosnian.
The international community proved, once again, that it had the abili-
ty to raise money for its Bosnian democratic experiment –investing some $20 mil-
lion over a period of five years in this new network– but not a clear understand-
ing of the best ways to achieve its stated goals. A fraction of the money invested
in the project would have been enough to bring together some of the best
Bosnian journalists to produce a high-quality prime time news journal and an
issue-oriented weekly political magazine instead of relying heavily on imported
foreign programming. With all of its generous investment, OBN was never given
the most precious asset: an “A” team of editors who would shape a program
focused on priorities in the peace process. After all, that focus was missing in
international policy toward Bosnia as well.
Post-war Bosnia saw an explosion of new media outlets. According to
a study by Zoran Udovicic, president of the Media Plan Institute, in mid-1991
there were 377 newspapers and other publications in Bosnia, 54 local radio sta-
tions, 4 TV stations, one wire service, and state Radio-Television with 3 channels.
At the end of the war in 1995 there were 272 active media outlets: 203 in the
Federation and 69 in Republika Srpska. In March 1997, there were 490: 270 in
the Federation and 220 in Republika Srpska5. The problem was that –with the
war-time exodus of hundreds of journalists, the absence of educated young pro-
fessionals in both newsrooms and management, and the lack of a functional
economy– most of the newly-started media depended either on international
donors or on local war profiteers with dubious political agendas. In the absence
of a strategy, which could have included the creation of a high-quality national
public broadcast system and support for the establishment of a respectable daily,
much of the donors’ money was wasted on media projects of no relevance. “A
cost-benefit analysis of media investment in 1996 indicates a poor return. The
problem is lack of overall strategy and absence of expertise”, an International
Crisis Group report of March 18, 1997, stated. 
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The fate of Oslobodjenje
In a country deeply divided into three nationalist-controlled territories, there was
little room left for media still advocating inter-ethnic tolerance. A case in point
was the fate of Oslobodjenje. Internationally praised as “the paper that refused
to die”, and awarded all of the most prestigious prizes in world journalism –Paper
of the Year, The Consciousness and Integrity in Journalism Award, The Sakharov
Award for Freedom of Thought, The Freedom Award, and The Golden Pen of
Freedom, to mention just a few –Oslobodjenje faced the challenge of surviving
the peace. With almost all pre-war assets destroyed and looted, with a huge
wartime debt, and more and more senior journalists leaving after years of heroic
unpaid work, the paper was also exposed to constant attacks in the newly-estab-
lished nationalist Bosniak media. The Muslim SDA, unable to control
Oslobodjenje, backed a new daily –Dnevni avaz (Daily Avaz)– giving it generous
financial support, exclusive access to information, and even police and army sup-
port in distribution. 
Oslobodjenje, while anti-nationalist and independent of the ruling
parties, was losing the battle for readers. The paper lost some of its best journal-
ists, partly because it was unable to pay them, partly because of an increasing
divide between the management and editorial board over how to survive. In that
struggle for day-to-day survival, the paper failed to re-energize and to develop a
clear long-term strategy for regaining its central place in Bosnian journalism. 
Nevertheless, the lively and somewhat chaotic media scene in Bosniak-
majority territories proved to be the most pluralistic in Bosnia with the battle
between “the most read” and “the most respected” dailies (Avaz and
Oslobodjenje, respectively), as well as the rivalry between the two independent
weeklies (Dani and Slobodna Bosna), plus the continuous campaign in the nation-
alist weekly (Ljiljan) against all of the independent-minded journalists and media
outlets, and a variety of radio and television stations to boot. Bosniak leader Alija
Izetbegovic prided his party on “allowing the greatest media freedom in the
region”. The fact is that it was not the party that “allowed” the freedom, but
Bosnian journalists who won and preserved it in spite of their government.
Izetbegovic himself, irritated by the criticism of his party in the independent
media, attacked some of the Bosnian magazines as “media prostitutes”, alleged-
ly selling their services for a handful of dollars to the international donors. In that,
he was just replaying the same old song used by Milosevic and Tudjman in efforts
to silence the opposition in Serbia and Croatia. He thought it was perfectly fine if
the donor was, for example, his party but not the international organizations. 
Izetbegovic –together with Muslim religious community leader
Mustafa Ceric– was instrumental in trying to impose further Islamization of pub-
lic life in the territories under his control. In 1996, on the occasion of the first
post-war New Year celebration, he openly criticized Bosnian TV for projecting
images of public drinking, singing, and Santa Claus appearances, “which are not
our tradition”. The fact is that Bosniaks not only traditionally celebrated the New
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Year but also shared in the religious holidays of their Catholic, Orthodox, and
Jewish neighbors. Santa Claus bringing gifts to children was part of this in
schools, communities, and companies. Ceric also attacked Bosnian TV for using
terms such as “the Holy Father” and “his Holiness” in reporting about Pope John
Paul II’s activities, accusing it of “Catholization of Bosniaks”. That was just part of
the systematic campaign against secularism, conducted through Dzemaludin
Latic’s Muslim weekly Ljiljan. Latic was a close associate of Izetbegovic, who led
Ljiljan’s attack against mixed marriages, as well as a campaign against prominent
Sarajevo poet Marko Vesovic and a number of secular Bosniak intellectuals.
Editors of the two best political weeklies in Bosnia, Senad Pecanin of
Dani and Senad Avdic of Slobodna Bosna, were a constant target of radical
Bosnian Islamists’ attacks. Pecanin said that:
There is an extremely high price attached to practicing independent jour-
nalism here. And very few people are ready to pay it. That includes threat-
ening phone calls at 2 or 3 a.m. with the caller telling me where my car is
parked or the exact route my child takes to a day care center. Latic’s Ljiljan
once ran a doctored photo of me with Salman Rushdie depicting me as an
‘enemy of Islam’. President Izetbegovic himself, after we ran a dossier on
crimes committed against Serb and Croat civilians by renegade command-
ers of the Bosnian Army, accused us publicly of causing $200-300 million in
damage for international assistance denied to Bosnia. Then Ceric repeats
these accusations. And as a consequence, the printing company increases
the price of printing us; some distributors refuse to sell us; and some adver-
tisers cancel their contracts. Not to mention one of Sarajevo‘s notorious
warlord’s entry into my office pointing, fortunately, only a toy gun to my
head, or a bomb exploding in front of Dani’s office6.
Avdic was physically attacked and beaten in a downtown Sarajevo hotel on
December 24, 1995. After that, he ran an open letter in Slobodna Bosna
addressed to Izetbegovic, claiming that the police and military intelligence
“enable the state to have information on every single politician, officer, or jour-
nalist”, and concluding that the attack was an attempt “to settle accounts” with
him. “I do not know how much of this you can control”, Avdic wrote to
Izetbegovic. “If you cannot, it is horrible, and one should flee this country. If you
can but do not do it, it is no less dangerous and horrible”7. Prominent Bosnian
writer Miljenko Jergovic, reporting on the Bosnian media in Nedjeljna Dalmacija,
concluded, “If you judge it by Slobodna Bosna, there are Western European stan-
dards of freedom of the press in Sarajevo”8. But the price tag for Avdic’s editorial
independence included some fifteen court cases, two suspended sentences, and
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even an arrest at his office to take him to court. His case prompted High
Representative Karlos Vestendorp to intervene in Bosnia’s judicial system by mov-
ing the alleged libel cases from the criminal to the civil courts, thus taking the
threat to prosecute away from nationalist authorities, since in civil courts charges
can be brought only by individuals. 
Victims of violence - and silence
The state of the media was less satisfactory in Republika Srpska and even worse
in the Croat-controlled territories of Bosnia. An international presence in the elec-
tion process forced the ruling SDS to allow the existence of some alternative
newspapers. The International Crisis Group reported that
of these, Nezavisne novine was by far the most influential, evolving from a
fortnightly newspaper into a weekly in June and a daily in August [of 1996]
with financial assistance from the UK’s Overseas Development Agency, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and George Soros’
Open Society Fund. Moreover, the daily boasted a circulation of 4,000 and
the weekly a circulation of 9,000, which though objectively low was never-
theless far greater than any other publication in Republika Srpska9.
On August 25, 1999, Nezavisne novine ran an exclusive, entitled “Renegade
group of Prijedor policemen massacred more than 200 Bosniaks; Republika
Srpska Army saved survivors, murderers escaped prosecution”. That report –on a
crime that had happened seven years before, on August 22, 1992– was the first
ever in the Republika Srpska media on war crimes perpetrated by Serbs. The
paper published a thorough investigative report on how some 200 Bosniaks from
the Prijedor area, former inmates of the notorious Omarska concentration camp,
were bused to the Koricani cliffs on Vlasic mountain in Central Bosnia and sum-
marily executed. Seven of them survived the massacre, and Nezavisne novine ran
their testimony. The report prompted an avalanche of threats to the paper’s staff,
accusing them of “betraying the nation”, but the paper continued to print new
revelations of the crimes committed by the Serb paramilitary. 
The price of such reporting proved to be high. On October 22, 1999,
Reuters reported that a Bosnian Serb editor had lost his legs in blast. Zeljko
Kopanja, 45, founder, publisher, and editor of Nezavisne novine, was on his way
to his office at 7:15 a.m. when an explosive device planted under his car went off.
The blast severed one of Kopanja’s legs, and he was brought to Banjaluka Clinical
Center in critical condition. Surgeons amputated what was left of both of his
legs. Two weeks later, fighting both physical and emotional pain, Kopanja asked
his friends and family to put him in a wheelchair so he could “take a walk” down
Banjaluka’s main pedestrian street, he said in an interview. “Seeing people in the
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[Gospodska] street, some of them just shaking my hand, some sobbing, I knew I
had done the right thing. And I knew I had to persevere (in exposing the war
crimes) since I had sacrificed so much. I don’t think that any nation is criminal. It’s
individuals and certain policies, not a whole nation”, Kopanja said of his motives
to continue publishing10. “After all, what would my life be like if I confined myself
to a wheelchair and my home only!” He agreed that he was a victim not only of
the Serb war criminals, who wanted to silence him, but also indirectly of the
silence in other Serb media about the war crimes. “The silence of the others has
left us too lonely, exposed to accusations and vulnerable to attack. No one else [in
the Republika Srpska media] has joined us. But I don’t think it was politically or
ideologically motivated silence. It was fear”, Kopanja said.
Future priorities and recommendations
The experience of the 1990s offers lessons for “media intervention” in the
Balkans and in other countries and regions undergoing transitions to democracy.
Most important among these, international peace agreements and international
institutions that newly independent countries wish to join should lay out clear,
explicit guidelines and criteria concerning the independence of the media. The
Dayton agreement omitted this critical piece, leaving the media in all three states
–Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia– in the hands of those most responsible for the wars
in the first place. No wonder the media continued to promote nationalist agendas
and images, supporting their own leaders’ and ruling parties’ wartime goals, con-
demning neighbors, and resisting international efforts to bring about democratic
reform and reconciliation. 
What could or should have been done better? Following is a list of rec-
ommendations that might contribute to setting priorities and achieving better
results in the next stages of “media intervention”, not only in the Balkans but also
in countries experiencing a less traumatic transition to democracy. 
Ownership of the media
Ownership proved to be the single most decisive tool in the decade of nationalist
media manipulation throughout the former Yugoslavia. The tragedy of the
Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian media –and this is equally true for the whole pub-
lic sector in those countries– was that their transition in the 1990s was not a real
step from one-party monopoly to multiparty democracy. In all three cases, the
Communist Party monopoly was replaced by a nationalist party monopoly, using
the same totalitarian instruments of control. Milosevic in Serbia and Tudjman in
Croatia –both products of hard-line communist ideology– established immediate
and absolute control over all state media. They took over state radio and televi-
sion stations and the national dailies, Politika and Vjesnik respectively, and they
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expanded their parties’ media empires by taking control of a number of inde-
pendent and regional media outlets. The method was the same: the Milosevic
and Tudjman governments took over almost all Serbian and Croatian newspa-
pers, declaring that their privatization during the late 1980s under Yugoslav
reformist Ante Markovic was illegal, and making them a part of their propaganda
machinery. This was the fate of Borba, Vecernje novosti, and Ekonomska politika
in Serbia, and of Slobodna Dalmacija and Danas in Croatia, among others. 
The winning coalition of nationalist parties in Bosnia after the first
multiparty elections in 1990 tried to use the Milosevic–Tudjman recipe to subju-
gate the media in the republic, but Bosnian journalists challenged the law adopt-
ed in the nationalist-controlled parliament in spring 1991. They rejected the
nationalist claim of “the right of the democratically elected parliament to appoint
media editors and managers”. By the end of that year, journalists had won a
Constitutional Court case, arguing that even if the Bosnian media, as elsewhere
in the former Yugoslavia, enjoyed some state support, the money belonged to
the Bosnian public and not to the ruling parties. At Oslobodjenje, we went so far
as to reject publicly any further state subsidy if it would be used as blackmail over
our editorial policy. The Bosnian media victory was soon overshadowed, however,
by the media war drums over the rivers separating Bosnia from Serbia and
Croatia. Milosevic’s radio and television signals were imposed over all the Serb-
occupied territories of Bosnia, and Tudjman’s over the Croat-controlled territories.
The Bosnian voices of tolerance were replaced by voices of hate. Their dominance
in all three states continued long after the Dayton Peace Agreement was initialed
on November 21, 1995. Until the year 2000, the media remained in the hands of
warmongers, creating obstacles to reconciliation. 
Lesson learned: make the independence of the media an important
part of future peace agreements and one of the must-do requirements for
international acceptance of states in transition. These requirements must
include the overhaul of laws regulating the media and the acceptance of inter-
national standards of freedom of expression. In Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, the
still-prevailing concept of state media needs to be replaced with the concept of
truly public media. 
Representative managing and advisory boards
While state and regional government support of public media may still have a role
until there is a functioning economy, it is necessary to develop a legal framework
to protect independent media from political, party, and parliamentary control.
One way to do this in postwar and transitional societies is through the interna-
tionally supervised establishment of representative managing and advisory boards
comprising a broad civil society spectrum. These boards might include representa-
tives of independent associations of journalists and their labor unions; scholars
and writers; artists and athletes; human rights and other NGO activists; promi-
nent public figures and religious community leaders; international organizations
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concerned with press freedom; and other international institutions engaged in
democracy building. Their role should be to oversee and assist in the develop-
ment of internationally acceptable standards and practices, providing protection
for, rather than control of, the newly independent media. 
Professional associations of journalists
Throughout the region, professional associations of journalists have an important
role to play in efforts to restore the credibility and raise the standards of journal-
ism. Except for the Croatian Society of Journalists (HND), which remained active
in its efforts to protect and educate its members throughout a decade of oppres-
sive HDZ rule, most other regional associations have disintegrated along ideolog-
ical or ethnic lines. In Bosnia, there was not only a divide between associations of
professional and not-so-professional journalists, but also between associations
based on ethnic exclusivity. In the highly politicized, nationalistic environment of
the 1990s, supposedly professional associations of journalists rallied behind
“patriotic causes”. They neglected their primary responsibilities: to establish,
uphold, and develop standards and ethics of journalism; to organize and repre-
sent journalists in their search for decent pay, job security, benefits, and better
work conditions; to protect their membership –regardless of ethnic backgrounds–
against political and economic pressures from governments and political parties.
If they were to shift their focus away from the nationalist policies of the past
toward real-life issues and challenges, Balkan journalists would soon find that
their common interests and concerns are more numerous and more vital than
their differences. 
Watchdog journalism
A crucial missing link in rebuilding media credibility in the postwar Balkans is the
absence of a tradition of watchdog journalism. In post-communist societies, the
media did not have experience in critically examining and reporting on the work
of state and party institutions, and no institutions were responsive to public inter-
ests. The nationalist parties of the 1990s –like the communists in the post-World
War II period– did not have to answer questions about what they were doing or
why. It took almost five years after Dayton for the first major breakthrough in this
area, when the international High Representative in Bosnia introduced the
Freedom of Information Act providing citizens’ access to most information pos-
sessed by the government and other public institutions. While the Act creates a
legal framework for greater media access to the secretive world of power, there is
a need to develop a wide public information network: public affairs offices with-
in major governmental and public institutions; a communications culture in which
individuals and institutions are more responsive and available for legitimate pub-
lic concerns, interviews, and press conferences; and access to records and data-
bases of government and other public institutions. To help create that culture of
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transparency and public accountability, much more needs to be done to oblige
public institutions to have their own public relations officers, to train communica-
tions specialists for these positions, and, more than anything else, to train journal-
ists to ask questions of the greatest public relevance.
Education for journalism
Postwar Balkan journalism has a desperate need for creative educational initia-
tives. While there are some positive experiences –including the BBC School of
Journalism within the Media Center and the High College of Journalism within
the Media Plan Institute, both in Sarajevo, the region needs a thorough overhaul
of its formal schools of journalism. For the most part, these schools are based in
former socialist schools of political science that have no tradition of educating
modern media professionals. During the decade of war and propagandist manip-
ulation, the newsrooms in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia were devastated. Some of
the best professionals have left or been forced to leave; they have been replaced
with young, often uneducated and inexperienced reporters and editors who have
practiced more party propaganda than real journalism ever since. To meet both
the short-term demand for qualified journalists and long-term development
needs, the postwar Balkan media must pursue innovative educational approach-
es. These could include on-the-job training within the newsrooms of major media
outlets such as national radio, TV, and dailies, conducted by experienced regional
and international “editors-in-residence”. Working with journalists on their major
daily assignments, leading them through story development –from the initial
idea, to finding proper sources and documents, to shaping the story and provid-
ing adequate photos and graphs– would help establish some basic standards in
regional journalism. Even some simple rules, such as consulting multiple sources
for each story and always looking for “the other side” of an argument, would
greatly improve the quality and credibility of the media. 
Another innovative approach might include cooperative efforts in
developing and executing coverage of major ongoing issues and events, such as
election campaigns, truth and reconciliation processes, economic reforms, and
international integration processes. A local–regional–international team of edi-
tors and journalists working together to shape major media coverage of critical
issues would provide valuable learning experience for working journalists and
help set standards for future coverage of these issues. For example, media devel-
opment institutions operating in the Balkans could sponsor election campaign
coverage by selected media outlets –statewide radio and TV and leading dailies
and weeklies– including hands-on participation by competent regional and inter-
national advisers. Since Balkan media are more preoccupied with day-to-day sur-
vival than with long-term educational or development concerns, international
donors could help by offering comprehensive educational projects, soliciting
applications, and offering professional and material support to those who qualify.
Working on such projects, with the full participation of regional and internation-
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al advisers, would provide local editors and journalists with the skills for future
coverage of political campaigns in their countries. 
International exchange
Expanded international exchange should be an integral part of journalism educa-
tion. There should be a more systematic effort to provide talented Balkan journal-
ists who work for relevant national media with an opportunity to spend some
time –three months, a semester, or an academic year– in an international news-
room environment interacting and working with scholars and practitioners. The
combination of research, newsroom exposure, and internships at major interna-
tional media organizations would offer a valuable learning experience for work in
the region. 
Education of media managers
Of equal importance for a long-term media development strategy is education for
media management. Training managers to develop a sound business strategy
–with the proper balance of news and advertising; the optimum balance between
full-time staff and freelancers; and the best methods for increasing circulation,
classified advertisement, subscriptions, and other income-generating initiatives– is
key to the gradual move from media dependency on donors to self-sustainability. 
Refocusing donor strategies
International media donors still have a valuable role to play in the development of
independent Balkan media, but they, too, need to refocus their strategies. Instead
of sometimes indiscriminate spending on projects of dubious quality or relevance,
they might identify –on the basis of their performance in the 1990s and their cre-
ative and business potential– media outlets deserving support in their search for
higher professional standards and profitability. These outlets should be offered a
comprehensive aid package including financial support, investment, and lines of
credit to achieve their goals. 
Developing the media market
A competitive media market is needed to reduce media dependence on public
funds. In the Balkan experience of the 1990s, even internationally supervised pri-
vatization left nationalist governments in charge of the instruments of economic
harassment against independent media. The governments could silence the media
at will by controlling –through networks of their cronies– printing presses, distribu-
tion networks, newsprint supply, discriminative taxes, allocation of radio frequen-
cies, and manipulation of advertising. Prospects for the development of independ-
ent media would be substantially improved through lower taxes, equal access to
basic supplies and frequencies, nondiscriminatory sales networks and advertising,
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and the development of smaller, less expensive, and more competitive printing
facilities. Once a competitive media market exists in conjunction with long-term
support for the most relevant media outlets, the market will decide, for example,
which of the approximately 80 television and 200 radio stations currently operat-
ing in Bosnia Herzegovina should continue as economically viable businesses. 
Truth and reconciliation
Just as the Balkan media participated in the ultranationalist crusades of the
1990s, preparing the ground for war and justifying the worst atrocities in Europe
since the end of World War II, they now have a crucial role to play in truth and
reconciliation efforts. Five years after Dayton, the public in Serbia and Croatia still
has not been told the truth about the Bosnian war of 1992-1995. As long as this
is so, not only the history but also the future of the region will be vulnerable to
nationalist distortions and the accumulation of hatreds for new tensions and con-
flicts. Experience tells us that acknowledging and honoring the victims on all
sides, examining the record of atrocities, and neither denying crimes nor blaming
everyone equally, provide the best bases for reconciliation and coexistence in the
Balkans. Documenting and making public the atrocities and sufferings on all sides
would help the people of the region understand the complexities of the conflict
and the pain of the innocent: presenting to the Serbs the full extent of the siege
and killings of Vukovar and Sarajevo, the concentration camps in the Prijedor
area, and the Srebrenica massacre; educating the Croats about atrocities commit-
ted in their name against Bosniaks in Herzegovina and Central Bosnia and against
Serbs in Operation Storm in Croatia; and telling Bosniaks about the crimes com-
mitted against the Serbs during the siege of Sarajevo and against the Croats in
the Konjic and Bugojno areas.
Once confronted with documents and pictures of these crimes, pre-
sented to them during the previous decade as part of a heroic and even sacred
fight for survival, people will be better able to understand and support bringing
war criminals to trial. Such efforts to uncover the truth and mete out justice are a
precondition for the children of this tragic region, in which every generation of
the twentieth century has experienced war –my grandparents’ generation in
1914, my parents’ in 1941, my children’s and mine in the 1990s– to finally join a
peaceful and prosperous Europe. 
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